Mandukya Karika, verse 4.25

Text

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमिष्यते युक्तिदर्शनात् ।
निमित्तस्यानिमित्तत्वम् इष्यते भूतदर्शनात् ॥ २५ ॥

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvamiṣyate yuktidarśanāt |
nimittasyānimittatvam iṣyate bhūtadarśanāt || 25 ||

25. From the point of view of logical reason a cause for the subjective impression must be assigned. But from the standpoint of the highest Reality or the true nature of things, we find that the (so-called) cause (of the subjective impression) is, after all, no cause.

Shankara Bhashya (commentary)

To1 this objection, we reply as follows:—We admit that you posit a cause of the subjective experience on account of such arguments as the existence of the variety (in the objective world) and because of the experience of pain. Stick for a while to your argument that reason demands that an external object should exist to produce a subjective impression. (The opponent)—Please let us know what you (Advaitin) are going to say next. (Reply)—Yes, the2 jar, etc., posited by you as the cause, that is to say, the cause of the subjective impression, are not, according to us, the external cause, the substratum (of the impression); nor are they the cause for our experiences of variety. (Objection)—How? (Reply)—We say so from3 the standpoint of the true nature of Reality. When the true nature of clay is known a jar does not exist apart from the clay as exists a buffalo in entire independence of a horse. Nor does cloth exist apart from the thread in it. Similarly the threads have no existence apart from the fibres. If we thus proceed to find out the true nature of the thing, by going from one cause to another, till language or the object denoted by the language fails us, we do not still find any (final) cause. “Bhūtadarsanāt” (from the true nature of the thing) may be “Abhūtadarsartāt” (from the unreality of the experiences). According to this interpretation, the meaning of the Kārikā is that we do not admit external objects as the cause on4 account of the unreality of these (external) objects, which are as unreal as the snake seen instead of the rope. The (so-called) cause5 ceases to be the cause as the former is due to the illusory perception of the perceiver. For,6 it (the external world) disappears in the absence of such illusory knowledge. The man in dreamless sleep and trance (Samādhi) and he who has attained the highest knowledge do not experience any object outside their self as they are free7 from such illusory cognition. An object which is cognised by a lunatic is never known as such by a sane man. Thus8 is answered the contention regarding the causality based upon the arguments of the perception of variety and the existence of pain.