Mandukya Karika, verse 4.23-24
Text
हेतुर्न जायतेऽनादेः फलं चापि स्वभावतः ।
आदिर्न विद्यते यस्य तस्य ह्यादिर्न विद्यते ॥ २३ ॥
heturna jāyate'nādeḥ phalaṃ cāpi svabhāvataḥ |
ādirna vidyate yasya tasya hyādirna vidyate || 23 ||
23. The cause cannot be produced froth an effect which is without beginning, nor is the effect born of its-own nature (itself). That which is Without beginning is necessarily free from birth.
प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमन्यथा द्वयनाशतः ।
संक्लेशस्योपलब्धेश्च परतन्त्रास्तिता मता ॥ २४ ॥
prajñapteḥ sanimittatvamanyathā dvayanāśataḥ |
saṃkleśasyopalabdheśca paratantrāstitā matā || 24 ||
24. Subjective knowledge must have an objective cause; otherwise both must be non-existent. For this reason as well as that of the experience of pain, the existence of external objects, accepted by other thinkers, should be admitted.
Shankara Bhashya (commentary)
In accepting the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect you are forced to admit the absence of birth regarding them. How is it so? The1 cause cannot be produced from an effect, which is without beginning. In other words, you do not certainly mean that the cause-is produced from an effect which is, itself, without beginning and free from birth. Nor do you2 admit that the effect, by following its own inherent nature, (i.e., without any extraneous cause) is produced from a cause which is unborn and without beginning. Therefore2 by admitting the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect, you, verily, accept the fact of their being never produced. It is because we know from common experience that what is without beginning is also free from birth which means a beginning. Beginning is admitted of a thing, which has birth, and not of a thing which has none. An objection is raised in order to strengthen the meaning already stated. The word Prajñapti in the text signifies “knowledge”, i.e., the experience of such notions as that of sound, etc. This (subjective) knowledge has a cause, i.e., an (external) agent or object corresponding to it. In other words, we premise that knowledge is not merely subjective but has an object outside the perceiving subject. Cognition of sound, etc., is not possible without objects. For, such experience is always produced by a cause. In1 the absence of such (external) object, the variety and multiplicity of experiences such as sound, touch, colour, viz., blue, yellow, red, etc., would not have existed. But the varieties are not non-existent, for these are directly perceived by all. Hence, because: the variety of manifold experiences exist, it is necessary to admit the existence—as supported by the system of the opposite school—of external objects which are outside the ideas of the perceiving subject. The subjective knowledge has one characteristic alone, i.e., it is of the very nature of illumination. It does not admit of any variety within itself. The variety of experiences of colour, such as blueness, yellowness, etc., cannot possibly be explained, by merely imagining a variety in the subjective knowledge, without admitting variety of external objects which are the substratum of these multiple colours. In other words, no variety of colour is possible in a (white) crystal without its coming-in contact with such adjuncts as the external objects which possess such colours as blueness, etc. For this additional reason also one is forced to admit the existence of external object,—supported by the Scripture of the opposite school,—an object which is external to the knowledge (of the perceiving subject): Misery2 caused by burns, etc., is experienced by all. Such pain as is caused by burns, etc., would not have been felt in the absence of the fire, etc., which is the cause of the burns and which exists independent of the knowledge (of the perceiving subject). But such pain is experienced by all. Hence,3 we think that external objects do exist. It is not reasonable to conclude that such pain is caused by mere subjective knowledge. For,4 such misery is not found elsewhere.